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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: Against Police Interrogation-




Not since the period separating Escobedo v. Illinois' and Miranda
v. Arizona 2 have so many said so much about confessions. The past
two years have witnessed a flurry of scholarly confessions articles, 3
the Justice Department's report on Miranda,4 and a new edition of
the leading police interrogation manual. 5 Last term's Supreme
Court decisions in Colorado v. Connelly6 and Colorado v. Spring,7 hold-
* I appreciate the comments of Yale Kamisar, Wayne LaFave, Chris Wonnell, Mike
Hoeflich, Gerry Bradley, and Kit Kinports on a preliminary draft of this Article. A
preliminary version of this Article was presented at the University of Illinois/Illinois
State Bar Association conference on the bicentennial of the Constitution, March 7,
1987.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. J.D., University
of Michigan, 1983; B.A., Northwestern University, 1980.
1 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985); Ogletree, Are Con-
fessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1826
(1987); Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat?, 26
WASHBURN LJ. 1 (1986); Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435
(1987); White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1986);
J. Grano, Police Interrogation and Confessions: A Rebuttal to Misconceived Objections
(1987)(Occasional Paper for the Center for Research in Crime and Justice, New York
University School of Law).
4 U.S. DEP'T. OFJUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY GEN-
ERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1986).
5 F. INBAU,J. REID &J. BucKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed.
1986).
6 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
7 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
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ing, respectively, that an insane or misinformed suspect may law-
fully confess, cannot help but stimulate the controversy.
Anyone familiar with the Escobedo-Miranda debate could have
predicted that thoughtful people would continue to disagree about
the appropriate legal doctrine regarding confessions. One might
not have predicted, however, that the terms of the debate would
change so little. In the eighties, as in the sixties, the protagonists
appeal to three divergent values. One is the government's interest
in obtaining evidence of crime. The other two, often confused
within the same category, are freedom from police abuse and per-
sonal autonomy. Courts and commentators describe the Miranda
rules in the same terms they used to describe the due process volun-
tariness requirement, as a compromise the aim of which is to maxi-
mize the frequency of confessions consistent with some conception
of the other two values. 8
I believe that this basic characterization of the dispute is mis-
taken, because personal autonomy and the need for evidence com-
pete in almost every case. The vast majority of confessions do not
result from the suspect's "free will and rational intellect" 9 any more
than they result from old fashioned and brutal third degree tactics.
Instead, the bulk of confessions results from irrationality, mistake,
and manipulation. Any expectation that truly voluntary confessions
are available on a systemic basis depends either on unsupportable
factual assumptions or on an interpretation of voluntariness that
reduces that word to signifying no more than the absence of third
degree methods.
We must, therefore, choose between honoring the suspect's au-
tonomy and forgoing the acquisition of significant and otherwise
8 For example, in a late opinion summarizing the development of the voluntariness
test, Justice Frankfurter described the test as an accommodation of two principles in
polar opposition. One pole, he wrote, "is the recognition that [q]uestioning suspects is
indispensable in law enforcement.... At the other pole is a cluster of convictions each
expressive ... of the basic notion that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not be
used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against it .... Cardinal among them
... is the conviction.., that men are not to be exploited for the information necessary
to condemn them...." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 578-81 (1961)(plurality
opinion)(footnotes and citations omitted). Miranda, too, is thought of as a compromise.
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966)("This Court, while protecting
individual rights, has always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the
legitimate exercise of their duties."); White, supra note 3, at 10 ("The compromise
reached in Miranda may not be the best means of accomodating the conflicting interests
involved.")(footnote omitted); Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 21-23; Grano, Selling the Idea to
Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MIcH. L. REv.
662, 676 (1986)(reviewing F. INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 5).
9 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978)(quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 307 (1963), and Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
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unobtainable evidence of crime. The rationale of Miranda,
grounded in the privilege against self-incrimination, and the lan-
guage of the due process cases equating voluntariness with freedom
of the will, suggest resolving this conflict in favor of autonomy. The
holdings of the cases, however, whether dealing with the voluntari-
ness of a confession or with the "knowing and intelligent waiver" of
the privilege, suggest the contrary.
This ambivalence results in the prominent anomalies in confes-
sions law. At trial, after establishing probable cause of guilt and
when the defendant enjoys the protection of a neutral bench, a per-
sonal advocate, and public scrutiny, the government may not so
much as put a polite question to the defendant. But, between arrest
and commitment, the police may badger, trick, and manipulate the
suspect in an environment solely within their control and to which
no other witness is admitted. With respect to confessions, society
insists on enjoying "at one and the same time the pleasures of indul-
gence and the dignity of disapproval." 10
In this Article, I propose a general reform of confessions law.
This reform program is animated by rationality and is capable of
implementation without constitutional amendment. I propose
resolving the tension between the demand for evidence and the de-
sire to honor the suspect's autonomy by admitting that the need for
evidence justifies compelling the suspect's testimony, just as itjusti-
fies compelling the testimony of nonparty witnesses. Outright re-
peal of the privilege against self-incrimination, although desirable,
is impractical, and subversive interpretation is inconsistent with
principled constitutionalism. But the Supreme Court could disin-
corporate the privilege from the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause, a step that would accomplish much of what needs to be
done on the level of constitutional law. This alteration would en-
able the states to establish humane systems of in-court
interrogation.
10 Yvor Winters used this phrase to describe the work of T. S. Eliot. Y. WINTERS, ON
MODERN POETS 71 (1959). On the necessity of choosing between autonomy and confes-
sions, tacitly or deliberately, see Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV.
865, 883-84 (198 1) (reviewing Y. KAMisAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980))("Miranda does not, any more than the due process
test, come directly to grips with the dilemma arising from our simultaneous commitment
to the privilege against self-incrimination and to a law enforcement system in which
police interrogation is perceived as a necessity."); Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in
Criminal Detection, Detention, and THal, 33 U. Ci. L. REV. 657, 674-75 (1966); Grano, supra
note 8, at 676 ("The tension in existing confessions law can be resolved either by re-




To say that interrogation serves an important purpose, how-
ever, is not to say that interrogation ought to be conducted by the
police. The problem of coerced confessions presents a problem
substantially different from the nonproblem of compelled testi-
mony. Accordingly, I propose, as a corollary to the withdrawal of
the constitutional privilege, a per se exclusionary rule for any state-
ment obtained by the police from an arrested person. The Supreme
Court could achieve this result by tightening the fourth, sixth, or
fourteenth amendment limitations on police interrogation. Regret-
tably, the explicit command of the fifth amendment would remain
fully applicable to federal agents. Any fair reading of that amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination would require safeguards
against invalid waivers equivalent to those available in related pro-
cedural contexts, a result that would reduce the government's ability
to enforce certain federal laws. But, on the whole, the proposed
regime would prevent abusive police tactics more effectively, would
secure a larger quantity of probative evidence, and would foster a
more principled and coherent body of law than any present
alternative.
II. ARE VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS OBTAINABLE
ON A SYSTEMIC BASIS?
A confession to the police is not admissible unless, as a due
process matter, it is given voluntarily. According to the Court in
Mincey v. Arizona, a confession is not voluntary unless it is the prod-
uct of "a rational intellect and a free will." 1 If given after the police
have taken the suspect into custody, a confession is not admissible
unless the police administered Miranda warnings and obtained a
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver."' 12
Satisfaction of these standards is conceptually possible, but not
on a general basis. The devout Christian may believe that God com-
mands confession of an isolated criminal act; the sincere utilitarian
may conclude that society as a whole will benefit from his punish-
ment. But in the vast majority of cases, the confessor never achieves
this sort of detached reflection; most confessions are anything but
"voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." By this I mean more than the
true, but trivial, statement that confessions, like other phenomena,
11 437 U.S. at 398.
12 Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851, 853 (1987). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966) ("If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and
a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel.").
702 [Vol. 78
1988] SUPREME COURT REVIEW 703
are governed by causal laws. 13 In a noncausal universe, confessions
would not be probative of crime and could not be described as vol-
untary because they would not result from anything associated with
the suspect's personality. 14 Confessions would instead simply hap-
pen, and legal rules could neither encourage nor prevent them.
Neither, however, do I mean that confessions typically are not vol-
untary, if voluntary means what it means in the substantive criminal
law. A voluntary act in criminal law is any bodily movement result-
ing from a conscious decision.' 5 Under such a standard, even con-
fessions obtained by torture would be voluntary.
But, as other criminal law doctrines recognize, responsibility,
whose existence depends on a heuristic sense of freedom, requires
more than a bodily action. Only a rational person, free from pres-
sures inconsistent with the dignity of rational persons, is responsi-
ble. Therefore, the criminal law provides the defenses of insanity,
duress, necessity, and mistake. 16 Insanity, duress, and fraud are also
defenses to civil liabilities that arise from individual choices, such as
entry into contracts and the execution of wills. 17 Of greatest rele-
13 See Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 868-
80 (1979)(discussing free will and confessions, concluding that on assumption that con-
fessions are caused, test for admissibility should be whether reasonable person under
similar pressure would confess).
14 Cf Weinreb, The Complete Idea ofJustice, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 752, (1984). Professor
Weinreb states:
In order for a person's unconstrained decision to count in the way that gives rise to
moral responsibility, the decision must be made in a stable natural context. With-
out that, he would be like someone who wakes up in a room where there is a board
of buttons to push and no indication of which button does what. He pushes a but-
ton at random, and outside the window a building blows up. He pushes another
button and lilacs bloom on the flagpole. But when he pushes the second button
again, the flagpole vanishes, leaving only the lilacs blooming in midair. Hard as he
tries to discover a pattern, he cannot. He has a certain kind of freedom; it is up to
him alone to decide which buttons to push, or whether to push any. But it is free-
dom in a funhouse, a nightmare in which nothing that one does can be depended
on. Having stumbled on a benign situation outside the window, he resolves not to
push any more buttons; but then the situation begins to change whether he pushes
them or not.
Id. at 771-73 (footnotes omitted).
15 1 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2 (1986).
16 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (duress), § 3.01 (choice of evils-necessity),
and § 4.01 (mental disease).
17 See 12 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1487, at 323 (H.
Jager rev. ed. 1970)("It is undoubtedly true that wherever the circumstances are such as
to warrant an action for deceit for inducing a person to enter into a contract, they will
certainly warrant avoidance or recision of the bargain.")(footnote omitted); Frankel,
From Private Rights Toward PublicJustice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 527-28 (1976)("Recogniz-
ing that people imprudently err in far slighter matters [than confession] under far
slighter pressure [than custodial interrogation], we now allow the targets of door-to-
door salesmen a few days of tranquil reconsideration before holding them to the
purchase of a vacuum cleaner.")(citing U.C.C. § 3.502); Sutherland, Crime and Confession,
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vance to confessions, which amount to de facto guilty pleas, the
Supreme Court has refused to accept guilty pleas made without a
complete understanding of the consequences and alternatives.18
If positive law is evidence of positive morality, as I think it is,
then our society refuses to recognize as voluntary those acts that
result from personality traits or external circumstances outside the
broad ambit of ordinary experience. We excuse the man who em-
bezzles the ransom to save his kidnapped child because he is no
more criminal than the rest of us. We also excuse the psychopath,
whose disease, like the gangster's threat, establishes a cause for con-
duct external to the actor's personality.
If this is what voluntariness means, that the causes of the con-
duct in question are internal to the personality of a normal person,
then few confessions indeed are voluntary. Most obviously, confes-
sions are self-destructive. 19 We do not speak of criminals "volunta-
rily" leaving fingerprints at the scene of the crime or receiving
undercover agents into confidence. We may hypothesize cases in
which a dedicated moralist, upon detached reflection, elects to exer-
cise autonomy in favor of confession. But can this be so in
79 HARV. L. REV. 21, 37 (1965)(circumstances of typical custodial interrogation would
void any will under doctrine of undue influence).
18 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976). In Henderson, the Court invalidated a
plea of guilty to second degree murder because the indictment charged first degree mur-
der, and, in pleading to the lesser charge, the defendant was never apprised that the
state could not prove second degree murder without proving an intent to kill. Under
these circumstances, "the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an
intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received real
notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recog-
nized requirement of due process.'" Id. at 645 (citation omitted).
19 See H. SILVING, ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 258-59 (1964). Professor Silving
states:
As there are special situations in which a "guilty plea" is advantageous to a defend-
ant, so there are also instances in which it is rational for him to confess. But in the
vast majority of cases a confession is highly damaging to him, even allowing for the
fact that, notwithstanding affirmance to the contrary in law, a confession may result
in mitigation of a sentence. In fact, in capital cases a confession is often a form of
suicide. The Roman rhetorician Quintilianus pertinently observed that "such is the
nature of confession that one who confesses may be regarded as insane." If we
substitute for "every confession" the phrase "every confession in which no objec-
tive or otherwise rational advantage to the defendant can be shown to obtain" and
for "insane" the term "neurotic," the proposition would be clearly valid today.
Hans Gross implied this when saying as regards confessions other than those in-
duced by objective advantage, by hallucinations or religious influences, that he
"knew of no analogy in the inner nature of man, in which anybody with open eyes
does himself exclusive harm without any contingent use being apparent." Clearly,
in this type of case man confesses to satisfy some irrational inner need. Psychoana-
lysts explain the confession phenomenon as a product of a confession compulsion,




thousands of cases involving people who have never hitherto ex-
pressed any morality different from self-interest?
The psychological explanations for confessions suggest other-
wise. Guilt and a desire to be punished, a desire to shift responsibil-
ity to others, and the need for love are the subconscious pressures
impelling confessions. 20 Generally, these pressures operate unseen,
but the few cases allowing access to the suspect's mental processes
suggest that when a confession occurs a "free will and a rational
intellect" are not at work.
In People v. Heirens,2 1 for example, the police arrested a teenage
burglary suspect. At the hospital to which he was taken, doctors, at
the behest of the police, administered sodium pentathol. In the re-
sulting confession, Heirens admitted his involvement, but ascribed
primary responsibility to "George," a thoroughly wicked person
under whose influence Heirens had selected apartments to be bur-
glarized. "George" always frustrated Heirens' efforts to prevent the
planned crimes. When asked for a description of "George,"
Heirens described himself exactly.
Standing alone, this might be interesting theory and an eerie
case. The police tactics taught in interrogation manuals, however,
appear to be effective precisely because they play upon such psycho-
logical pressures. 22 The interrogator sympathizes with the guilt-rid-
den suspect, suggesting that real responsibility lies with the victim,
an accomplice, or the suspect's family.23 The alienated, insecure
suspect is flattered with compliments to his criminal prowess. 24
And, the most effective method of all, the notorious good cop/bad
cop routine, clearly has the effect of stimulating the suspect's associ-
ated needs for love on the one hand and punishment on the other.25
20 See T. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS 251-53 (1959) (interesting discussion of
transferrence and the need for punishment); 0. ROGGE, WHY MEN CONFESS 224-30
(1959); Schoenfeld, A Psychoanalytic Approach to Plea Bargains and Confessions, 9J. L. & Psy-
CHOLOGY 463, 465-67 (1975). From the psychoanalytic perspective, the moral attitudes
internalized during childhood demand reconciliation with authority. The suspect im-
pelled by such attitudes desires both empathy (as a signal that authority has forgiven
him) and punishment (because the subconcious mind associates punishment with the
expiation of childhood offenses).
21 4 Ill. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
22 See Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42
(1968); Grano, supra note 8, at 672-75 (Whose police "tactics designed to increase the
suspect's anxiety ... are intended to increase the pressure-the compulsion-on the
suspect to confess.").
23 See, e.g., F. INBAU, J. REID &J. BucKLEY, supra note 5, at 106-18.
24 Id. at 118-20.
25 Id. at 151-53. The authors believe that the good cop/bad cop routine is most
effective when performed by a single interrogator. The psychoanalytic approach would
predict the same conclusion; if a confession results from the associated needs for love
7051988]
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Presumably, the manuals commend these strategies because of their
general effectiveness, not because the psychological pressures they
play upon are rare or unusual among those suspected of crime.
Those suspects who are neither vulnerable to psychological
pressure nor inclined to abandon self-interest can still be baited to
confess with police deception. 26 The suspect's rational fear is ag-
gravated by heavy-handed threats and promises of future lenience
or severity, which are, in turn, always conditioned by equally heavy-
handed disclaimers that no promises are being made. The suspect's
rational despair is exploited by the fabrication of extrinsic evidence.
The claims of prominent police spokespersons, that unless the
police have a substantial period of unfettered control over the sus-
pect for the purpose of employing these tactics suspects would
choose not to confess, confirm the notion that most confessions are
obtained in violation of the suspect's autonomy.27 Very few people
confess spontaneously; but, as one might expect from this discus-
sion, such persons typically suffer from identifiable mental impair-
ments. A leading police manual counsels that many are not guilty of
the crimes they confess. 28 Indeed, a recent study of such cases de-
scribes those who confess spontaneously as "persons who have
committed crimes [who] are compelled to confess and accept
punishment." 29
Finally, granting the theoretical possibility of autonomous con-
fessions, which cases fit into this category? The inaccessibility of the
police tactics and the suspect's mental processes means that, despite
the possibility of a truly voluntary confession, we lack the magic net
to catch the unicorn.30
and punishment, the dispensing of love and punishment alternately from a single source
would be comparatively more effective. A male/female team of interrogators might
prove more effective still.
26 See Grano, supra note 8, at 668-70 (discussing deceptive tactics recommended by F.
INBAU, J. REID & J. BUCKLEY, supra note 5.
27 See, e.g., Inbau, Police Interrogation: A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 16, 17-18 (1961)("Self condemnation and self destruction not being nor-
mal behavior characteristics, human beings ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, sponta-
neous confessions. They must first be questioned regarding the offense.").
28 F. INBAU, J. REID &J. BUCKLEY, supra note 5, at 197 (A spontaneous confession "is
very likely to be false. It may be the product of a mentally ill person, or it may stem from
an otherwise normal person's effort to incur a temporary police detention in order to
gain some other deliberately conceived objective.").
29 Bernick, Of Crime and Conscience, 68 A.B.A.J. 307, 309 (1982)(emphasis added).
30 See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams: A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, in POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND POLICY 113, 136-37 (Y. Kamisar
ed. 1980); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIO ST.
LJ. 449, 498-99 (1964); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View,
52J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 21, 44-45 (1961).
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Taken together, these considerations suggest that judicial dicta
about voluntariness are inapt descriptions of doctrines designed to
restrain abusive police tactics without preventing the extraction of
confessions. The old due process cases clearly had this flavor, 3' and
the Court has taken the same approach this term in two cases de-
cided under Miranda and the fifth amendment.
In Colorado v. Connelly,32 the Court held that, absent police
abuse, a person who is incompetent due to clinically identifiable in-
sanity may voluntarily confess and knowingly and intelligently waive
Miranda rights. Connelly, incompetent at the time due to untreated
severe schizophrenia, walked up to an off duty uniformed policeman
and confessed a homicide. The startled officer administered Mi-
randa warnings. After the arrival of detectives, Connelly purported
to waive his Miranda rights, made incriminating statements, and di-
rected police to the scene of the killing.
The Colorado Supreme Court suppressed the evidence, reason-
ing that the initial statements to the off duty officer were involuntary
and that the subsequent statements to the detectives, made after
they had taken Connelly into custody, were obtained without an ef-
fective waiver under Miranda.3 3 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that, for due process purposes, a confession is not involuntary
without police misconduct and that waiver of Miranda rights is deter-
mined by a standard no stricter than the standard governing the vol-
untariness of a confession.34 Whether with respect to due process
31 See Kamisar, What is an Involuntary Confession?, in PoLIcE INTERROGATIONS AND CON-
FESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND POLICY 1, 23, (Y. Kamisar ed. 1980)(Supreme Court has
never considered relatively strong resistance of suspect asjustifying more intense police
pressures); Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic
Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966); Herman, supra
note 29, at 457.
32 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
33 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
34 107 S. Ct at 523 ("There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a
'voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment
confession context."). This reasoning appears to suggest that the police could obtain a
valid Miranda waiver by any tactic the fruits of which would not be deemed involuntary
as a matter of due process. Thus, prolonged detention incommunicado puncuated by
physical violence might not invalidate a subsequent waiver. See Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1953)(detention incommunicado and marathon questioning; confession held
voluntary); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952)(defendant kicked and threatened
with blackjack one hour before questioning; confession held voluntary); Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)(twelve days of detention incommunicado, including slap-
ping of defendant; confession held voluntary). Coupled with the holding in Spying, the
language in Connelly equating due process voluntariness and a fifth amendment waiver
may also imply that police deception to induce a waiver after the administration of the
warnings is constitutional. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. In Miranda, the
Court took a different view. 384 U.S. at 476 ("any evidence that the accused was
1988] 707
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or to Miranda, Connelly's "perception of coercion flowing from the
'voice of God' . . . is a matter to which the United States Constitu-
tion does not speak."'3 5 Four Justices dissented from the Miranda
holding,3 6 and Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the
voluntariness holding as well. According to Justices Brennan and
Marshall, "[w]hile ... police overreaching has been an element of
every confession case to date, it is also true that in every case the
Court has made clear that ensuring that a confession is a product of
free will is an independent concern." '37
Along the same lines as the decision in Connelly, in Colorado v.
threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege."). More recently, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), the Court reversed the exclusion of evidence obtained from a suspect who in-
voked the right to silence when questioned about the crime for which he was arrested
but then made an incriminating statement several hours after the first interrogation ter-
minated, in response to questions about another crime. The second interrogation was
initiated after a fresh set of warnings. In holding that Miranda does not "create a per se
proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on
any subject, once the subject in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent[,]" the
Court noted that to "permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momen-
tary cessation would clearly frustrate Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of question-
ing to undermine the will of the person being questioned." 423 U.S. at 102-03
(footnote omitted). The test under Mosley is whether the suspect's "right to cut off ques-
tioning" is "scrupulously honored." 423 U.S. at 103 (quoting Miranda). This, of course,
is inconsistent with the marathon incommunicado interrogation approved of in some
voluntariness cases. Even more clearly inconsistent with the Connelly dictum is Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), in which the court held that no fruit of interrogation is
admissible if obtained after the suspect invokes the right to counsel, as opposed to the
right to silence, unless counsel has conferred with the suspect in the meantime. To say
that there is "obviously no reason" to scrutinize confessions more closely under Miranda
than under the due process test ignores the failure of the voluntariness test to either
prevent police abuse or protect individual autonomy in the majority of cases. See
Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fith Amendment
and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND POLICY 41. If the fifth amendment applies to police interrogation, it seems far
more "obvious" to apply the same standard for waiver that would be applied to any
other proceeding. None of the Justices, I suspect, would consider valid a waiver of the
privilege by one detained incommunicado for days before a grand jury or by a defendant
at trial who takes the stand in response to perjured testimony orchestrated by the prose-
cution and recanted after the defendant is cross-examined. The only reason for apply-
ing a different standard during interrogation is to obtain evidence that the privilege is
designed to shield. In my view, this approach is subversive of constitutionalism.
Although I think the privilege is a serious mistake, the Justices have no commission to
restrict its scope because they, too, think it is a mistake.
35 107 S. Ct. at 524.
36 107 S. Ct. at 524 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(refusing to join the Court's holding
that preponderance of the evidence standard governs judicial determination of waiver
issues); 107 S. Ct. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); 107 S. Ct. at 525 (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
37 107 S. Ct. at 527 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
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Spring38 the Court held valid the waiver of Miranda rights by a sus-
pect who expected to be questioned about federal firearms viola-
tions but who made incriminating statements when asked about a
Colorado homicide. This decision appears to extend to the Miranda
waiver context the standard of Frazier v. Cupp,"9 a 1969 Supreme
Court decision holding that, by itself, police fabrication of an ac-
complice's confession does not render the suspect's own confession
involuntary.
Whatever rhetoric may grace the opinions, holdings such as
these elevate the acquisition of evidence above the suspect's auton-
omy. Statements made by a patently insane suspect are not intelli-
gent, and statements made in response to police deception are not
knowing.
The Court's willingness to admit these confessions suggests the
misleading nature of the verbal focus on autonomy. 40 Most suspects
cannot be rationally persuaded to confess, only tricked, condi-
tioned, or forced to do so. As a compromise, we may compel the
confession of one suspect in three and leave two alone. We are,
however, unable to compel a suspect and not to compel him at the
same time. But, that is what the Court and defenders of police in-
terrogation purport to approve. And any compromise of the former
sort, among suspects rather than between values, begs the question
of whether and under what circumstances compelling suspects to
confess is justifiable.
The most sophisticated defense of the voluntariness test illus-
trates the incongruity of admitting confessions on the basis of the
suspect's autonomous decision. Writing thirteen years after Mi-
randa, Professor Grano proposed to recognize the test's separate
concerns with mental freedom, undue influence, and reliability.4 1
Reasoning from premises which differ little from those in this Arti-
cle, Grano advocated an objective reasonable person standard to
govern the mental freedom aspect of the inquiry. A confession
would not be held involuntary unless "a person of ordinary firm-
ness, innocent or guilty, having the defendant's age, physical condi-
tion, and relevant mental abnormalities (but not otherwise having
38 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
39 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
40 See Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions, Prepared Remarks at U. S.
Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference 59-60 (Sept. 13, 1986)("the question
presented [in Connelly] ... is not whether the Court should adopt a new constitutional
rule but whether it should rid itself of-not take seriously, if you will-the terminology of
an old rule, language that for a long time has not usefully explained what the Court has
actually been doing.")(emphasis in original).
41 Grano, supra note 13.
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the defendant's personality traits .. .), and strongly preferring not
to confess, would find the interrogation pressures overbearing.- 42
At face value, this standard would require excluding almost
every confession not spontaneously rendered by the perpetrator.
Given that confession is, from the standpoint of self interest, irra-
tional, that police manipulation is its "but for" cause, that the
"mental abnormalities" impelling confessions are to be taken into
account, what "person of ordinary firmness" "strongly preferring
not to confess" would do so unless he found the "interrogation pres-
sures overbearing"?
Responding to this concern, Professor Grano conceded that
"police bent on obtaining a confession usually [ordinarily?] pre-
vail," but he then denied that, under his formulation, "most confes-
sions will have to be supressed. ' '43 He explained that the " 'person
of ordinary firmness' test reflects a moral standard prescribing the
effort and resistance that reasonably can be expected of suspects in
custody."' 44 "[T]he objective of the interrogation.., is to succeed,"
and, therefore, "due process principles only limit the means" to-
ward that end.45
Like the Court before him, Professor Grano cares not at all for
autonomy itself; he cares only about the methods by which auton-
omy is overborne. Like the Court before him, Professor Grano
phrases the test in terms of what rational persons would choose
under the circumstances and immediately admits that the test must
mean something else if confessions are to be obtained. So it is not
surprising that in a recent essay Professor Grano argues that per-
sonal autonomy, the legal relevance of which he ascribes to Escobedo
and Miranda, is inconsistent with police interrogation as practiced
and as it must be practiced if it is to succeed. 46
42 Id. at 906 (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 907 (footnote omitted).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Grano, supra note 8. Professor Grano argues that police interrogation is inconsis-
tent with the suspect's autonomous choice. I agree with this contention. Professor
Grano claims further that obtaining evidence of crime is more important than honoring
a suspect's autonomy, as long as police methods do not rise to an unspecified level of
offensiveness. He admits that this judgment is inconsistent with Escobedo and Miranda
and claims that for this reason those cases should be overruled. This, I believe, is only
an argument against the privilege against self-incrimination, for it is also true that the
obtaining of evidence is inconsistent with and more important than shielding the ac-
cused from relevant questions at trial. As long as the privilege applies, Miranda is subject
to cogent criticism only for not going far enough to provide effective enforcement of
fifth amendment rights. All attempts to exempt police interrogation from the privilege
or to defend a lesser standard of waiver during interrogation are based on hostility to
the very existence of the constitutional provision and, therefore, are unconvincing.
710 [Vol. 78
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
What we know about police interrogation and confessions
strongly suggests that autonomous confessions are not obtainable
on a general basis. This conclusion suggests the central question,
one from which the confusion of autonomous choice with freedom
from police cruelty has deflected analysis. That question is whether,
and, if ever, when, compelling a confession is justifiable?
III. SHOULD WE HAVE THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION?
Treating the Constitution as a religious, rather than a political,
text invites two easy errors. The first is to read into the Constitu-
tion's ambiguous provisions our own visions of political morality,
thereby elevating legislative preferences to the unjustifiably exalted
status of natural law. The parallel temptation is to treat the clear
provisions of the Constitution as reflecting incontestable and holy
moral judgments.
Anyone who has argued about the meaning of due process
knows the former tendency. Whoever openly assails the privilege
against self-incrimination quickly discovers something of the sec-
ond. Even Jeremy Bentham, accustomed to unreflective resistance
to argument and without the impediment of a venerated text, was
astonished at the reverence otherwise thoughtful people held for
the privilege.47
Bentham's argument against the privilege is simple: the privi-
lege denies the court the best available evidence regarding the de-
fendant's conduct with respect to the crime charged. But the great
force of his passage on self-incrimination is not the positive argu-
ment for admitting the evidence; it is, rather, his thorough and dev-
astating survey of the reasons for keeping it out.
There is, Bentham acknowledged, always "the old woman's rea-
Such efforts are analagous to the claim that, because national security is inconsistent
with and more important than the prohibition of prior restraint, the first amendment
should be "interpreted" to allow prior restraint.
47 See 5J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 229 (1827)("In the minds of
some men.., if you set about proving the truth of a proposition, you rather weaken
than strengthen their persuasion of it. Assume the truth of it, and ... you do more
towards riveting them to it than you could do by direct assertion, supported by any [of]
the clearest and strongest proofs."). Given the extensive reliance on Bentham that fol-
lows, I should point out that Bentham was more than a strong thinker and active re-
former. He also helped to shape modern liberal criminal law and the law of evidence
and, indeed, liberal democratic society in general. Wigmore wrote that "[r]emembering
that in less than three generations nearly every reform which Bentham advocated for the
law of evidence has come to pass, we might almost regard his condemnation of any rule
as presumptively an index of its ultimate downfall." J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2250, at 3092 (Ist ed. 1904).
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son" that "tis hard upon a man to be obliged to criminate him-
self."'48  This, we might note, is the Supreme Court's "cruel
trilemma of self accusation, perjury or contempt." 49 Dean Gris-
wold 50 and Professor Greenawalt 5 1 also have endorsed this argu-
ment. Yes, answered Bentham, "[h]ard it is upon a man ... to do
anything that he does not like. ... What is no less hard upon him,
is, that he should be punished: but did it ever yet occur ... to pro-
pose a general abolition of all punishment, with this hardship for a
reason for it?"52 "Suppose, in both cases, conviction to be the re-
sult: does it matter to a man, would he give a pin to choose,
whether it is out of his own mouth ... or out of another's?" 53
We might balk a little at this and insist that it is at least margin-
ally more cruel to compel persons to convict themselves than to
convict them with independent evidence. But is this marginal cru-
elty enough to justify foregoing the evidence? It is not enough to
justify foregoing testimony of nonparty witnesses that incriminates
loved ones or exposes personally ruinous but nonincriminating
facts. By the same token, the marginal cruelty of questioning the
accused in open court after the appointment of counsel does not
seem great enough to justify abandoning such an important source
of evidence.
Two related arguments link the privilege to the prevention of
torture and similar abuses. Justice Frankfurter argued that the privi-
lege "was aimed at ... a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star
Chamber," 54 a greater evil than any loss of evidence. "The privi-
lege against self-incrimination," he wrote, "is a specific provision of
which it is peculiarly true that a 'page of history is worth a volume of
logic.' 55 The privilege, injustice Frankfurter's view, had a histori-
cal justification and should be historically interpreted. Similarly, but
with a more prospective emphasis, Wigmore, although deeply skep-
tical about the privilege's justification,56 maintained that, without it,
any system of justice would degenerate because of the invitation to
take brutal and oppressive shortcuts. 57 On the basis of this under-
48 j. BENTHAM, supra note 47, at 230.
49 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
50 E. GRISWOLD, THE FiFrI AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
51 Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15,
39 (1981).
52 j. BENTHAM, supra note 47, at 230.
53 Id. at 231.
54 Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
55 Id. at 438 (citation omitted).
56 In an early article, Wigmore urged abolition. See Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum
Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891).
57 J. WIGMORE, supra note 47, § 2251.
712 [Vol. 78
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
standing, the privilege is itself a prophylactic against abusive
interrogation.
But the inconsistency of the existence of the privilege with abu-
sive tactics does not establish that the privilege is necessary to pre-
vent them. As Bentham pointed out, a question is not a
thumbscrew. 58 By the same association of evil institutions with any
of their practices, he wrote, it would do as well to forbid the judges
to sit in a room with stars adorning the roof.59 Many legal systems
permit judicial examination of the accused and the drawing of ad-
verse inferences from silence without appearing to tolerate more
abusive interrogation than exists in the United States. 60 As a histor-
ical matter, torture in England declined prior to the legal recogni-
tion of the privilege. 61 This experience suggests that the privilege
reflects, rather than causes, the legal determination to eradicate in-
vestigative brutality. If this is so, rules aimed directly at abusive
questioning suffice as long as the political will exists to enforce
them.
Absent that will, the coexistence of the privilege with the legiti-
mated desire to obtain the evidence has done a great deal to en-
58 SeeJ. BENTHAM, supra note 46, at 240-41.
59 Id. at 241-47.
60 See G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41-
42 (1969). Under the Continental system, the suspect is not, and indeed may not be,
sworn as a witness and, thus, subjected to perjury. Nor may any sanction other than the
drawing of adverse inferences be applied to silence. If questioning brings suspicion to
bear upon a witness, as opposed to the accused, the witness may demand to be charged
with an offense. The system is therefore not as different from our own as sometimes
supposed, but, in both theory and practice, it brings to bear much greater pressure on
the accused to give evidence than is brought in an American trial. Id. See also Bratholm,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in American and French Law, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 34,43-
47 (1983); Clemens, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law-Germany, 51
J. CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 172 (1960); Mendelson, SelfIncrimination in Amer-
ican and French Law, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 34, 43-47 (1983). While Talmudic law once for-
bade any form of self-incrimination, voluntary or otherwise, Israel appears now to follow
English practice. See Cohn, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations Under Foreign Law-
Israel, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 63 (1961); Cohn, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination Under Foreign Law-Israel, 51,J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
175 (1960). Even in England, the judges can and often do comment on the prisoner's
failure to give evidence. Williams, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination Under Foreign
Law---England, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC. 166 (1960). Only Japan
among the free societies provides a broader privilege than does the United States. See S.
DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 280-81 (B. George trans. 1965)(privilege applies
to witnesses as well as defendants; privilege extends to incrimination of relatives). The
upshot is that the questioning of the defendant and the holding of incredible answers or
silence against him is consistent with political democracy and the dignity of the
individual.
61 See Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1063, 1078-79 (1986).
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courage abusive police tactics. Precisely because the privilege bars
humane interrogation under legal supervision, subterranean inter-
rogation has known tolerance and even encouragement. 62 Mi-
randa's critics never go so far as to claim that the police have legal
power to compel the suspect to answer.63 Yet implicit in criticisms
62 According to the Wickersham Commission:
The constitutional privilege that no man shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case, often is a serious obstacle to the detection of crime.
There is much evidence that despite this constitutional declaration, and because of the
obstacles thus presented, confessions of guilt frequently are extorted by the police from
prisoners by means of cruel treatment, colloquially known as the third degree.
National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 3 (1931) (Wickersham
Commission Report No. 11) (emphasis added). See also J. McGuIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT
§ 2.02, at 13 (1959)("Deprived of assurance that the prosecutor can probe for a sus-
pect's information by decent, orderly questioning, police are tempted to bully their pris-
oner into admissions suggesting lines of investigation usable to turn up other evidence
of guilt. The privilege may encourage torture rather than the reverse.")(footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original); Kamisar, EqualJustice in the Gatehouses and Mansion ofAmerican Crim-
inal Procedure, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAY IN LAW AND POLICY 34
("One cannot but wonder how often the availability of the privilege ... once the accused
reaches the safety and comfort of the mansion [i.e., the courtroom], only furnishes the
state with an additional incentive for proving the charge out of his own mouth before he
leaves the gatehouse [i.e., the police station]."); Kauper,Judicial Examination of the Accused:
A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1238-39 (1932)("It is not strange
thatjudges are reluctant to compel the police, whose coercive methods are productive of
confessions, to observe the rule requiring prompt presentment before a magistrate in
whose presence the prisoner can bask in privileged silence."); McCormick, Some Problems
and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239, 278 (1946)("Absten-
tion from third degree abuse will still depend on the ability of the police to protect
society without resort to them.")(footnote omitted). I do not claim that in the absence
of the privilege abusive police interrogation would disappear. Indeed, "as regards pos-
sible police station abuses, the continent on the whole is no better and no worse off than
we are." G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE GRIFFITHS, supra note 60, at 20. But, I do claim that
in the absence of the privilege effective controls on police interrogation would become
politically feasible. The exclusion at trial of any statement obtained by police, whether
for impeachment purposes or otherwise, would leave only the investigative utility of
admissions as a rational incentive for police interrogation. Irrational incentives, such as
mere sadism, racism, or the like, must be coped with through civil or criminal prosecu-
tion and administrative discipline. But given an effective substitute for police extracted
confessions and a refusal by the judiciary to admit such evidence, offensive police tactics
would surely diminish significantly. See Kauper, supra, at 1242-44.
63 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964)(White, J., dissenting) ("Cases in
this court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional
rights. If an accused is told he must answer and does not know better, it would be very
doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against him."). Recent attacks on
Miranda similarly refuse to endorse police power to compel incriminating answers. See
Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
797 (1982); Caplan, supra note 3, at 1445-58. Both articles condemn the advising of the
suspect of the right to remain silent and both condemn the offering of a lawyer to the
suspect because a lawyer may induce the suspect to exercise the right to silence. Neither
article urges abolishing the right to silence in the face of police questioning nor denies
its existence in positive law. This, surely, is an untenable position; the privilege cannot
be both good and bad with respect to a single defendant in a single prosecution.
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of Miranda is the judgment that the police ought to have this power,
or at least ought to appear to have it, because the courts do not, and
society needs it. This anti-constitutional attitude, in practice, cre-
ated the problem of coerced confessions. Interrogation fled from
the privilege, but it did not die, and in its more bestial form ex-
tracted from generations of suspects many confessions that mere
compelled testimony would never have produced.
Modem defenders of the privilige have recognized the failure
of its traditional rationales, and have struggled to devise a convinc-
ing replacement. In his study of the privilege, for example, Dean
Griswold concluded that, although a "good many efforts have been
made to rationalize the privilege, to explain why it is a desirable or
essential part of our basic law[,] . . . [n]one of the explanations is
wholly satisfactory. ' 64 Dean Griswold's own justification for the
privilege, however, turns out to be a quick recitation, without im-
provement, of the arguments Bentham justly scorned, such as the
argument from self-evidence, the "old woman's reason," and the
"association with unpopular institutions." 65 Dean Griswold adds
that the privilege might protect the innocent as well as the guilty,66 a
claim that followed by seventeen years a critic's challenge to show
one case in which the privilege protected an innocent person. 67
Dean Griswold did not acknowledge the previous challenge, but he
did offer hypothetical cases in which the privilege, as a revolution or
an earthquake, might protect the innocent. His argument did not
confront the previous demand for an actual case; but, after a power-
ful response along the same lines, he withdrew his defense of the
privilege based on the protection of the innocent. 68
64 E. GRISWOLD, supra note 50, at 7.
65 Id. at 7-9 (alleging that self-incrimination is cruel; that the privilege is self-evi-
dently good; and that the privilege prevents persecution based on political or religious
beliefs).
66 Id. at 9-14.
67 Carman, A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional Privilege From the Criminal, 22 MINN. L.
REv. 200, 204 (1938)("Let the most ardent advocate of constitutional privilege to the
criminal point out a single case in all the annals of American jurisprudence where an
innocent man has been, or could have been, convicted because compelled to answer
questions about the crime of which he was accused."). Forty-nine years before Dean
Griswold's book appeared, another critic asserted that "I have never known or heard of
a case where an innocent person suffered any disadvantage from [taking the stand]. It
stands to reason. The truth is consistent with itself, and everyone who is speaking the
truth can tell in the main a straight story." Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing
Self-Incrimination, 15 YALE LJ. 127 (1906). It is illuminating that after five decades no
such case could be found; and, even more illuminating is the fact that, in spite of this,
the best defense that could be offered for the privilege at a time of crisis was the appeal
to the protection of the innocent.
68 See S. HooK, COMMON SENSE AND THE FiFrH AMENDMENT 32 (1957)(if accused is
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Indeed, I entertain little doubt that the privilege has caused the
convictions of more innocent persons than it has prevented. One
may hypothesize cases in which an innocent person might benefit by
withholding apparently incriminating evidence for which some un-
likely innocent explanation turns out to be true.69 But, are there
any who could not escape conviction by providing a complete ac-
count, incriminating and exculpatory evidence together?70 Against
the purely hypothetical risk to the innocent that the privilege com-
bats, its availability to nonparty witnesses often denies substantial
exculpatory testimony to the defense. 7 1 Although this may not be
so frequent or so dangerous as to justify defense witness immu-
nity, 72 there are real cases in which the privilege denies exculpatory
evidence to the accused, 73 and no real cases in which the privilege
protects an innocent defendant.
The one powerful argument for the privilege maintains that,
without it, the government would be able to harass its foes with be-
innocent by hypothesis, any exclusionary rule might protect the innocent); Griswold, The
Right To Be Left Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216, 223 (1960)(privilege is not justified by
protection of the innocent but by right of privacy). At some point, one is entitled to
wonder how many bad arguments for the privilege must be taken seriously before it
becomes fair to conclude, pending some startling innovation, that the privilege is simply
a mistake.
69 SeeJ. BENTHAM, supra note 47, at 209.
70 See S. HooK, supra note 68, at 54.
71 As Judge Friendly asserts:
In contrast to the rare case where it may protect an innocent person, it often may do
the contrary. A man in suspicious circumstances but not in fact guilty is deprived of
official interrogation of another whom he knows to be the true culprit; if the former
is brought to trial, the best he can do is call the latter as a witness and hope the jury
will draw the inference from the witness' assertion of the privilege which the jury
cannot be told it may do with respect to his own.
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L.
REV. 671, 680-81 (1974). Judge Friendly offered as an example In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), which extended the privilege to state juvenile court proceedings. Gault was ac-
cused of making an obscene telephone call but alleged that he had dialed the telephone
and then handed it to a companion who made the obscene comments. The extension of
the privilege to juvenile court proceedings prevents a suspect in Gault's position from
summoning and questioning the allegedly guilty party. The frequency with which de-
mands for defense witness immunity are raised and rejected suggests that the problem is
not exotic. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 772-73 (2d Cir. 1980)(collecting
cases), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
72 See Turkish, 623 F.2d at 772-73; Note, The Case Against a Right to Defense Witness
Immunity, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 139 (1983).
73 See, e.g, United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 913 (1979). In Herman, one defendant was a magistrate charged with taking kick-
backs from a bail bond agency as consideration for improperly dismissing certain cases.
The defense attempted to call court employees as witnesses who allegedly would have
testified that they had not shared with the magistrate the kickbacks given to them by the
bail bond agency. Rather than so testify, the court employees interposed a claim of
privilege, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to order immunity.
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lief probes and fishing expeditions. A first amendment privilege for
political and religious beliefs, however, would adequately prevent
the first evilJ 4 A fourth amendment right not to respond to com-
pulsory official inquiries unless a court determines that reasonable
grounds exist to believe that a crime has been committed and that
the person summoned has evidence regarding it would adequately
respond to the second.75
Other arguments for the privilege, as Bentham foresaw, are im-
plausible.76 Invocation of our adversary system, in which "the gov-
ernment [must] shoulder the entire load" of proving guilt,"7 merely
adds a pejorative label to a doubtful value preference for sport over
justice in criminal prose.cutions.78 The claim that the privilege helps
74 See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation,
Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI. 138,
145-46 & 166 (1960); Friendly, supra note 71, at 696-97; W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND
SociETY 75-76 (1967)("the argument for the privilege against self-incrimination as a
protection of First Amendment freedoms is diminishing in significance. It is my belief
that the proper place for devising solutions to abuses of freedom of speech and associa-
tion is the amendment which is primarily intended to protect against them.").
75 See Dolinko, supra note 61, at 1081-84; McNaughton, supra note 74, at 146-47. The
barrier to such an approach is United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1973), in
which the Court held that a grand jury subpoena is not a seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. Yet both arrest and subpoena amount to the threat of legal
violence to compel attendance at ajudicial proceeding. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
76-77 (1906) (subpoena duces tecum is a seizure). Surely as a fourth amendment matter,
the Supreme Court could hold that, before a witness must respond to official inquiries
under threat of institutional violence, there must be reasonable suspicion that a crime
has taken place and that the witness has evidence of the crime. The police may not do
more, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and it seems anomolous to allow a prosecutor to
command the police to do what they are not permitted to do themselves. See In re Kelly,
433 A.2d 704 (D.C. 1981)(en banc)(court invokes supervisory power to require reason-
able suspicion before admitting fruits of identification procedure in which defendant's
presence was secured by subpoena rather than arrest).
76 Others have reached similar conclusions. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 74, at 61
(privilege is "a doctrine in search of a reason"); McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 214 ("Honesty demands recognition that many of these
reasons, faithfully and solemnly repeated year after year, are nothing but pretentious
nonsense."). Most recently, David Dolinko, in an exhaustive article, analyzed the privi-
lege with more sympathy than it deserves, but he nonetheless concludes that it has no
accessible justification. See Dolinko, supra note 60.
77 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citation omitted).
78 There is nothing dispositive about the adversary or the inquisitorial label. See W.
SCHAEFER, supra note 74, at 70 ("Our system of civil procedure is adversary," but that
has not barred the introduction of discovery procedures designed to aid in the difficult
job of ascertaiing the truth.");J. Grano, supra note 3, at 6 ("It is inquisitorial to require
the defendant to stand in a lineup, to yield his blood for testing, to provide handwriting
samples, and to provide pretrial discovery of an intended trial defense to the prosecutor.
Certainly the investigative grand jury is an inquisitorial institution .... [O]ur system
contains both accusatorial and inquisitorial characteristics.") (footnotes omitted). Ben-
tham called the argument based on the government's duty to "shoulder the whole load"
the "fox hunter's reason," according to which "[t]he fox is to have a fair chance for his
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defeat bad laws is misdirected unless, as seems unlikely, the evil of
crime varies with its susceptibility to discovery through interroga-
tion.79 Thought crimes can be investigated only through interroga-
tion, but so too can many homicides. Claims about the self-evident
value of autonomy are inconsistent with the unavailability of the
privilege when the witness must incriminate dear ones or reveal ru-
inous noncriminal facts. It seems also to ignore that crime victims
are individuals too; putting one citizen in a state of psychic tension
to protect another against homicide or rape is the only defensible
value judgment when circumstance forces the choice. In short, the
privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional mistake.
IV. Is THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPELLED TESTIMONY AND
A COERCED CONFESSION?
There is a difference between compelled testimony and a co-
erced confession. At the threshhold, it is useful to recall that the
Court's antipathy toward confessions had not, until Miranda, drawn
any energy from the privilege against self-incrimination.80 Until its
life: he must have (so dose is the analogy) what is called law: leave to run a certain
length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape." J. BENTHAM,
supra note 47, at 238-39 (emphasis in original).
79 Bentham stated that the privilege might be justified
if the aggregate body of the laws were so constituted, that the mischief resulting
from such as are mischievous, outweighs, upon the whole, the good resulting from
such as are of a beneficial character. But ... the supposition ... seems altogether
improbable: for, on this supposition, a state of anarchy would be less mischievous
than, would be preferrable to, such a state of government.
Today, it might be asked whether, taking modem experience on the whole, the evasion
of criminal responsibility by the securities manipulators of the 1930's, the leftists of the
1950's, the figures in the political scandals of the 1970's and 1980's, and the gangsters,
price fixers, drug dealers, and tax cheats known to every decade, has made a positive or
a negative contribution to society.
80 The coerced confession cases are the progeny of Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). In Brown, the state relied on Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), but
the Court held that "the question of the right of the State to withdraw the privilege
against self-incrimination is not here involved .... Compulsion by torture to extort a
confession is a different matter." 297 U.S. at 285. None of the subsequent cases in-
voked the fifth amendment as authority. As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Malinski v. New
York,
the question is not whether... [the defendant] by means of a confession was forced
to self-incrimination in defiance of the Fifth Amendment. The exact question is
whether the criminal proceedings which resulted in his conviction deprived him of
the due process of law by which he was constitutionally entitled to have his guilt
determined."
324 U.S. 401, 416 (1945)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). References to the privilege in
pre-Escobedo cases can be found, but only in dissenting opinions. See W. SCHAEFER, Supra
note 74, at 15 n.41. In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court sup-
pressed a confession in a federal prosecution on fifth amendment grounds. Brain surely
means that the privilege applies to custodial interrogation. But, in conflating the privi-
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1964 decision in Malloy v. Hogan,8 1 the Court did not apply the privi-
lege to the states as a matter of due process. But constitutional law
regulating the extraction of confessions by state officers began thirty
years before in Brown v. Mississippi.8 2
It is wise as well, when Miranda is under attack and much is said
about the extravagance of preventive constitutional rules, to recall
that the Supreme Court did not just awaken in unison one morning
and decide to make war on law and order. Brown confessed after
being physically tortured, whipped, as the deputy in charge testified
in open court, but "[n]ot too much for a Negro; not as much as I
would have done, if it were left to me."8 3 As the Wickersham Com-
mission report suggested,8 4 the Mississippi deputy was scarcely less
progressive than his contemporary metropolitan colleagues in New
York and Chicago.
The Court set out on the course of one who desires neither to
tolerate abuse nor forgo the utility of confessions. Unfortunately,
the Court described the constitutional test as an inquiry into volun-
tariness, although, in practice, the test turned on police methods
and not on the suspect's autonomy.8 5 As previously pointed out,
the test could not turn on the suspect's autonomy if it were to per-
mit the use of confessions on any significant basis. The holdings of
the old voluntariness cases reflect the judgment that evidence is
more important than the personal autonomy of suspects, but not as
important as the prevention of abusive police tactics.
Is this a defensible ranking of the competing values? I have
argued that the privilege is a mistake; that the need for evidence
justifies compelling suspects to talk. Excluding notions of individual
lege with the common law confessions rule, which was to become the due process volun-
tariness rule, the Brain Court did not explain whether the privilege placed limits stricter
than or identical with those imposed on custodial interrogation by the confessions rule.
As far as I am aware, the Court did not suppress a confession in a federal case on fifth
amendment grounds under circumstances that would not have caused its suppression on
due process grounds as well in the years between the Bram and Miranda decisions.
81 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Not until Malloy did the Court retroactively identify the confes-
sions cases as self-incrimination cases, holding in the process that the fifth amendment
applies to the states, which is a conclusion that, according to the argument, is necessary
for the premise. It is little wonder that this "might have seemed to some a shotgun
wedding of the privilege to the confessions rule." Herman, supra note 230, at 465 (foot-
note omitted).
82 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
83 Id. at 284.
84 National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, supra note 62 at 83-
102, 123-37.
85 See supra note 31. For a good treatment of the voluntariness test's evolution to-




autonomy, then, what is wrong with a little torture to extract the
evidence? If confessions may not, except in rare cases, be volunta-
rily obtained, and if evidence is more important than autonomy, why
tarry over how the evidence is obtained? Because, again with Ben-
tham, we condemn suffering that is gratuitous.8 6 If summons, con-
tempt, and cross-examination effectively protect the relevant values,
every iota of additional suffering spent for the same end is wrong.
Torture, moreover, is a special problem for utilitarianism because it
represents an especially attractive case for rejecting utilitarianism's
"failure to take seriously the distinction among persons." 87 A slight
benefit to all from the total suffering of one is the nightmare, corner
solution challenge intuition offers Bentham, and, while he might not
have shrunk from it, we certainly will 8 8 and should, so long as less
dreadful methods might secure the same return. 8 9
86 "[AIlthough it has been too frequently forgotten, . . the delinquent is a member
of the community, as well as any other individual... and... there is just as much reason
for consulting his interest as any other. His welfare is proportionately the welfare of the
community-his suffering the suffering of the community." I J. BENTHAM, WORKS 398
(1843).
87 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 5, at 27 (1971). Rawls objects to utilitarianism
primarily because utilitarianism tolerates, indeed celebrates, a net increase in benefits
even if the increase accrues to the wealthiest at the expense of the poorest. Id. The
objection is far more compelling in the interrogation context, in which one person might
be put in complete agony, rather than simply denied some benefit in exchange for a
slight enhancement of the personal security enjoyed by all other individuals in the
community.
88 Bentham was not of one mind on the proscription of torture. In a paper published
only recently, he suggested that, in rare instances, torture might be the lesser of two
evils, and proposed a system of strict regulation for its lawful employment. See Twining
& Twining, Bentham On Torture, in BENTHAM AND LEGAL THEORY 39 (M. H. James ed.
1973). Yet, Bentham did not publish the essay and concluded it with the statement that
"[i]t is with a trembling hand I enter upon this difficult and invidious task." Id. at 54.
Bentham relied on a hypothetical involving two arsonists, one of whom is captured, but
refuses to turn on his accomplice. Bentham also stressed that the threat of torture might
often suffice in such a situation, thus minimizing the actual suffering required. Today,
more compelling hypotheticals may be devised. Nonetheless, I doubt the law's ability to
cabin institutional torture within the bounds of its hypothetical justification. At any rate,
the problem is a serious one, and no one justly may accuse Bentham of sadism; his
agitations played an important role in restricting the death penalty, as well as moderat-
ing other forms of punishment and produced the first statutory proscription of cruelty to
animals. See C. PHILLIPSON, THREE CRIMINAL LAw REFORMERS 232-33 (1923).
89 The strongest case for lawful torture is a paradox: suppose the prisoner has infor-
mation relating to a gang of sadists that tortures innocents to death. In such a case, I
have grave doubts that the absolutist position may be defended even in categorical
terms. In utilitarian terms, the case against official torture depends on skepticism about
the extent of the need for torture on the one hand and the difficulty of limiting torture to
cases of genuine necessity on the other. Consider, for example, Leon v. State, 410 So.
2d 201 (Fla. App.), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1982). The brother of a kidnap
victim delivered the ransom to one of the kidnappers, a confrontation ensued, and the
kidnapper drew a gun. Police then arrested the kidnapper, and,
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A defendant in a civil case, even a serious one threatening social
and financial ruin, must answer any otherwise lawful question. But
the manner of asking such questions is regulated by law and is not
left to the police. No one suggests a privilege against testifying con-
trary to interest in civil cases. Neither does anyone urge a system in
which a doctor charged with malpractice could refuse to answer
questions in court but in which the court would receive in evidence a
statement obtained after agents of the plaintiff kidnapped the de-
fendant, held her in a secret safehouse for a week or two and ques-
tioned her without relent. Tacking Miranda onto such a system-
warning the kidnapped doctor that she need not answer and that she
may consult a lawyer before further questioning-sounds like com-
edy. But comedy often has a tragic point.
The problem is not with adding Miranda; the doctor is in a dan-
gerous environment and will be better protected with counsel than
without. The problem is the need to kidnap the doctor to obtain her
evidence in the first place. My example is bizarre, but it illustrates
how the privilege against self-incrimination injures the system. If
honored in spirit as well as form, the privilege defeats the search for
truth in an extremely serious way. If honored in form only, the priv-
ilege invites coercion by driving the search for truth underground.
But if the voluntariness cases ranked the relevant values in their
proper order, they also placed too much emphasis on factual con-
clusions govemed by police testimony and erroneously described
the key concern as freedom of the will rather than police abuse. The
Miranda Court saw the privilege as a solution to the defects of the
[flor the very good reason that [the victim's] life was in grave danger from [an ac-
complice] if [the defendant] (or the officers) did not return within a short time, the
police immediately demanded that the defendant tell them where [the victim] was.
When he at first refused, he was set upon by several of the officers. They threatened
and physically abused him by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until
he revealed where [the victim] was being held. The officers went to the designated
apartment, rescued [the victim] and arrested [the accomplice].
410 So. 2d at 202. The government did not attempt to introduce the statements so
obtained at the trial; the issue on appeal was whether a subsequent confession was vol-
untary given the prior violence. The court, over a strong dissent, held that the confes-
sion was properly admitted. But, were the officers wrong to forcibly extract the location
of the kidnap victim? I think the answer is no, they were not, and that if they were sued
on a constitutional theory they should be allowed a defense of compelling state interest.
But accepting a system of official torture is a different matter. Legitimated torture
would tend to exceed whatever bounds initially confined it and would pose too great a
risk of political repression. Given that torture, even in a single transaction and consid-
ered in purely utilitarian terms, could be justified only when human life is in danger and
might realistically be saved, the proscription of official torture should be absolute. If
one of the nightmare hypotheticals ever comes to pass, the officials confronted with the
dilemma should know that, if they turn out to be right, they will have a defense but that
they act at their peril.
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due process approach. The substitution of a rule actually, for one
only nominally, based on autonomy, given enforcement, would in-
deed prevent police abuse. But it would also prevent confessions to
the same extent that autonomy and confession are incompatible,
namely, almost completely.
Miranda's fundamental doctrinal failure, then, is the confusion
of police abuse with violations of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. If the privilege has chased violence and trickery from the
courthouse to the police station, then the privilege will pursue the
violence and trickery. From the station, violence and trickery must
flee either to rampant perjury or to the elicitation of waivers.
The Miranda majority never explained how a suspect could
make a "knowing and intelligent waiver" while under the influence
of the same inherently compelling environment that justified the
warnings. 90 The available evidence, as one might suspect, suggests
that coercion now focuses upon the obtaining of waivers. 91 The
90 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White stated:
But if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as "Where
were you last night?" without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the
Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to con-
sult his retained counsel or counsel whom the Court will appoint?
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
91 See Special Project, Interrogations In New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519 (1967); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capi-
tal: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1447 (1968); Seeburger & Wet-
tick, Miranda in Pittsburgh: A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1967). The New
Haven and District of Columbia studies found that the warnings had little effect; in Pitts-
burgh, the confession rate, but not the conviction rate, declined significantly. Additional
data are canvassed by White, supra note 38, at 19 n.99. Professor White concludes:
"The great weight of empirical evidence supports the conclusion that Miranda's impact
on the police's ability to obtain confessions has not been significant." Id. See also Fran-
kel, supra note 16, at 528-29 ("multitudes of waivers are found to have occurred each
year, despite the fact that any person who knows what he is doing ought to volunteer
nothing")(footnote omitted)). The Justice Department's Report on Pre-Trial Interroga-
tion, supra note 4, has not shaken the conclusion that Miranda has not greatly impeded
law enforcement. Besides the Pittsburgh study, the Report relies primarily on before-
and-after comparisons of confession rates compiled by three prosecutors: Arlen Spec-
ter, Aaron Koota, and Frank Hogan. See id. at 57-60. Mr. Specter's data were collected
through February of 1967, seven months after Miranda; Mr. Koota's data were collected
through September 1966, three months after Miranda; and Mr. Hogan's data were col-
lected through December 1966, six months after Miranda. Controlling Crime through More
Effective Law Enforcement, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 201, 223, 1121 (1967)[hereinafter
Hearings]. Police unfamiliarity with the new rules is the most likely explanation for the
difference between the bulk of empirical data and the immediate before-and-after com-
parisons. As now-Senator Specter stated recently, "'Whatever the preliminary indica-
tions were 20 years ago, I am now satisfied that law enforcement has become
accommodated to Miranda, and therefore I see no reason to turn back the clock.' "
Kamisar, Landmark Rulings Had No Detrimental Effect, Boston Sunday Globe, Feb. 1, 1987
A27 (Focus Section)(quoting Arlen Specter). There are other defects with the before-
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warnings, in this respect, have failed, and I know of only a few ex-
treme critics of police interrogation who want them to work.92 If
every suspect in America took the warnings seriously and immedi-
ately invoked the right to counsel, the horde of criminals hitherto
confined to the rhetoric of right wing ideologues would indeed be
loosed upon us.
From Brown to Miranda to Connelly and Spring, the Court has
groped its way toward a legal regime that permits the extraction of
confessions but forbids doing so with needless brutality. The privi-
lege against self-incrimination is the chief legal obstacle to achieving
such an accommodation. For the privilege means that what interro-
gation there is must be conducted by the police. So long as the po-
lice conduct interrogation, judicial inquiries into actual coercion will
prove inadequate to secure the goal of preventing needless brutal-
ity. If the courts follow Miranda to its logical conclusion and enforce
the privilege fully in the interrogation context, then autonomy will
prevail over the need for evidence.
Questions must be asked, but they could be asked by people
other than the police, in a public place, under rules of law. We have
to live with constitutional mistakes, but, if there is an interpretation
of the Constitution that would permit such an arrangement, the
Court ought not to overlook it. I turn now to the search for such an
interpretation.
V. THE MATTER OF LAW
A. CAN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRIVILEGE AND THE NEED FOR
EVIDENCE BE AVOIDED THROUGH INTERPRETATION?
The Constitution does guarantee the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Those who believe that constitutions have the function
less of advising than of governing political behavior may not ignore
and-after comparisons. The Hogan data were based on the number of confessions in-
troduced before the grand jury, a procedural phase that comes after arrest and arraign-
ment. Hearings, supra, at 1121. The Hogan data, therefore, probably include many cases
in which the arrest and interrogation took place before Miranda, so that any statement
obtained without the warnings would not be used before the grand jury. All three
before-and-after comparisons measure only the frequency of any statement by the sus-
pect, not the frequency of statements by guilty suspects useful in establishing guilt.
None of the comparisons demonstrated any effect on the conviction rate, much less the
crime rate. Mr. Koota's own statment expressly admitted that the "decisions of the
Court in Mapp v. Ohio, Miranda, Escobedo and others, have not caused an increase in the
crime rate." Id. at 226. Indeed, Mr. Koota concurred with the observation of Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach that the idea that the Court's rulings had increased the crime rate was
"unutterable nonsense." Id.




this plain provision of our fundamental positive law. If we are to
have fundamental law, we may not pick and choose which of its pro-
visions we are willing to obey.
This concern, I believe, excludes Wigmore's idea of construing
the privilege to death because we think its basic policy is mistaken. 93
Grudging constitutionalism eventually will yield to the temptations
inspiring it and will altogether nullify the constitutional command.
From the fifth amendment, we need to look no further than the
present status of the fourth for proof of Wigmore's error.94 If an
interpretation of the privilege were available that allowed humane
interrogation for some reason independent of any extrinsic conclu-
sion that the privilege is a mistake, then the extrinsic conclusion
might justify selecting that interpretation over another which is
equally plausible but more expansive. What we are looking for is an
interpretation of the Constitution that allows interrogation but that
does not depend on rejecting constitutional value judgments.
For more than a century, the courts have tolerated police inter-
rogation as a way of circumventing the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Stated so openly, is there any question that, fairly read to
secure its objects, the fifth amendment forbids police interrogation
for evidentiary purposes?
The privilege cannot be confined to judicial proceedings; the
constitutional language, 95 history,96 and policy,9 7 as well as nearly a
93 See IIIJ. WIGMORE, supra note 46, at 3102 ("The privilege therefore should be kept
within limits the strictest possible. So much of it lies in the interpretation that its scope
will be greatly affected by the spirit in which that interpretation is approached.").
94 See, e.g., Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE LJ. 906, 947-48 (1986); LaFave, Fourth
Amendment Vagaries (Of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Bal-
ancing Askew), 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (1983); Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257 (1984).
95 The fifth amendment provides that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[J" U.S. CONST. Amend. V. If being "a
witness" is limited to taking the stand, then the privilege would not forbid the compul-
sion of statements outside the courtroom. But, the sixth amendment's confrontation
clause provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to
be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]" U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. If an out-of-
court declarant were not a "witness," this provision would be meaningless. If "witness"
means the same thing in both provisions, and there is no reason for thinking otherwise,
then the fifth amendment forbids using compelled pretrial statements as evidence of
guilt.
96 In 1791, the common law rule held the defendant incompetent, due to interest, to
testify at trial. See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29
MICH. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1930). It follows that the privilege applies to the use at trial of
out-of-court statements, for in no other way could the accused be made a witness against
himself. See KAMISAR, supra note 34, at 49-55.
97 Professor Satzburg acutely points out:
The honest question that is never addressed by the Miranda dissenters is the follow-
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century of Supreme Court precedents, 98 all support the application
of the privilege to statements obtained outside the courtroom. Typ-
ical police interrogation surely constitutes compulsion in any sense
of that word.9 9 If, as the Supreme Court has held, it is accepted that
comment on the failure to take the stand'0 0 or the denial of public
employment 10 ' constitute forbidden compulsion, the contrary prop-
osition borders on frivolity.102
If the privilege applies to police interrogation and interrogation
involves compulsion in the great majority of cases, then the use at
trial of interrogation's fruits in the great majority of cases is uncon-
ing one: If the drafters of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
intended that, as long as the possibility of incrimination in a criminal case exists, no
magistrate, judge or court of the United States could compel a person to answer
questions even though the person is given a lawyer, the proceedings are public and
recorded and scrupulously fair-could they possibly have intended to permit other
officials (police and prosecutors) to compel the same answers in secret sessions,
most often unrecorded, without the suspect having counsel, and with no judicial
protection against the nature and manner of questioning? Such an honest question
deserves an honest answer, the answer is Miranda.
Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 14-15. See also KamisAR, supra note 34, at 45-46 ("Given Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock and McCarthy v. Arndstein, Miranda appears to be an a fortiori case; that
is, unless one is prepared to rekindle the Twining-Adamson-Malloy debate.... Assuming a
'first amendment privilege' which would relieve the fifth amendment of its burden in
'belief probes,' most, if not all, that can be said for the privilege applies in spades to
police interrogation.")(footnotes omitted)); McNaughton, supra note 74, at 151-52
("Both policies of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of those which I reject,
apply with full force to insure that police in informal interrogations not have the right to
compel self-incriminatory answers.").
98 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955)(legislative hearings); Arndstein v.
McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920) (civil proceedings); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897)(police interrogation); Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154
U.S. 447, 479 (1894)(administrative proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892)(privilege applies in grand jury proceedings).
99 As Kamisar states:
Dwell for a moment on the reasoning that because police officers have no legal
authority to compel statements of any kind, there is nothing to counteract, there is
no legal obligation to which a privilege can apply, and hence the police can elicit
statements from suspects who are likely to assume or be led to believe that there are
legal (or extralegal) sanctions for contumacy. Is it unduly harsh to say, as those who
do not use strong words lightly have, that such reasoning is "casuistic"--"a
quibble"?
KAmISAR, supra note 34, at 46 (footnotes omitted) (quotingJudge Traynor and Professor
McNaughton). The aspects of police interrogation discussed supra notes 20-28 and ac-
companying text suggest an affirmative answer to Professor Kamisar's question. See also
infra note 105.
100 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
101 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
102 In an attempt to deny the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, the De-
partment of Justice Report offered as an example the questioning of Senator Edward
Kennedy following the Chappaquiddick incident. See Report to the Attorney General on
the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation, supra note 4, at 46. If this does not border on frivol-
ity, then the defenders of Miranda might, with straight faces, concede the desirability of a
"senatorial exception" to the Miranda rules.
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stitutional. Miranda squarely holds as much. 0 3 On reason and au-
thority, then, the fifth amendment appears to prohibit the use at
trial of any statement secured through custodial interrogation.
Miranda, I believe, is vulnerable, but only with respect to its fur-
ther holding that the warnings and the offer of counsel dispel the
otherwise unconstitutional compulsion of custodial interroga-
tion.104 The same pressures that "compel" the suspect to become
103 384 U.S. at 461.
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal
compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An
individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by an-
tagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion [described in the
police manuals] cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a practi-
cal matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may
well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Court "concluded that without proper safeguards the pro-
cess of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains in-
herently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467.
104 There can be little quarrel with the necessity, as opposed to the sufficiency, of the
warning and offer of counsel. As Professors Bator and Vorenberg wrote, at a time when
they were described as figures in "an interlocking directorate of criminal law institutes
with a decided Harvard flavor and a plan to preserve the police's authority to interrogate,"
F. GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICTED WOUND 173 (1970)(emphasis added), "for reasons too
obvious to explore at length, [warning the suspect] is absolutely essential. Certainly the
minimum condition for the exercise of autonomous choice is to tell the suspect that he
has a choice, that there is no legal obligation to talk." Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 31
at 71. Since administrative practice before grand juries typically includes a warning, the
Supreme Court has not yet had to decide whether a warning is constitutionally required.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 582 n.7 (1976)(plurality opinion). The
Mandujano plurality cogently points out, however, that police interrogation is more com-
pelling than are grand jury proceedings, and, accordingly, stronger safeguards are ap-
propriate in the police interrogation context. Id. at 579-80. Moreover, a grand jury
witness has time before appearing to consult with counsel, who might advise the witness
of the privilege's availability. Miranda's offer of counsel is consistent with the Court's
other self-incrimination cases. Counsel, of course, is available at trial. The witness sum-
moned to testify before a grand jury has the option of consulting counsel before any
questioning. The Court also has held that the fifth amendment requires the availability
of counsel before the privilege holder must comply with a contempt order compelling
the production of evidence in a civil case. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975). In
Maness, a state trial court ordered production of documents believed by their custodian,
but not the court, to be privileged. The court, in an order reviewable only by taking a
contempt citation, ordered production, and the custodian's attorney advised him not to
comply with the order. The court held the attorney in contempt as well, and the
Supreme Court reversed the contempt sanction against the lawyer. Since the underlying
litigation was civil in character, the privilege holder had no sixth amendment right to
counsel. Instead, the fifth amendment of its own force required the procedural safe-
guard of legal advice.
The privilege against compelled self-incrimination would be drained of its meaning
if counsel, being lawfully present, as here, could be penalized for advising his client
in good faith to assert it. The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other
rights, often depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in
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"a witness against himself" bear equally on the decision to take ad-
vantage of the warning. 10 5 The same secrecy that clouds the inquiry
into the voluntariness of a confession obscures the inquiry into the
effectiveness of a fifth amendment waiver.' 0 6 For these reasons,
strong advocates of police interrogation concede that, if Miranda's
legal underpinnings are, as I think they fairly clearly are, correct,
then any evidentiary use of interrogation's fruits, even when warn-
ings were given, is per se unconstitutional.10 7 If hypocrisy is the
compliment that vice pays to virtue, Miranda is the compliment that
the public interest pays to the fifth amendment.
The Court's efforts to enforce the fifth amendment necessarily
entail a morally unjustifiable loss of evidence, while its efforts to
preserve police interrogation because of its evidentiary value neces-
sarily entail a legally unjustifiable derogation of the constitutional
the subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. A layman may not
be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment
privilege. It is not a self-executing mechanism; it can be affirmatively waived, or lost
by not asserting it in a timely fashion.
Id. at 465-66 (footnotes omitted). As with grand juries and Miranda the Mannes Court
recognized that the option of consulting counsel is essential to the enforcement of the
fifth amendment right. To be distinguished from all overt confrontations between a sus-
pect and state agents are situations in which the government secretly records or ob-
serves statements that evidence a crime, as in cases of undercover agents and electronic
surveillance. In such situations, there is no compulsion, because the state action is not
the but for cause of the suspect's statement, only of its discovery. In these situations, the
suspect would have made similar statements even in the absence of the microphone or
government agent. A person's innermost thoughts may be committed to writing in a
diary; but, if the diary is seized consistently with the fourth amendment, its recitation of
incriminating statements does not implicate the fifth amendment, because the declarant
is not the conduit of the information. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976)
(subpoena directing attorney to produce documents that incriminate client does not of-
fend client's privilege against self-incrimination). Of course, as the government's pres-
ence becomes more overt, difficult lines must be drawn, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980), since state action that is the but for cause of a statement is not necessar-
ily unlawful compulsion. But, this does not undermine the gross distinction between
listening to a person talk and causing a person to talk, the distinction that separates
mere surveillance from interrogation.
105 See supra notes 8, 90.
106 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 129-37 (6th
ed. 1986).
107 See Grano, supra note 8, at 689 ("with unexacting waiver requirements .... profes-
sional interrogation can coexist with a right of counsel, but only intellectual dishonesty
can make such coexistence theoretically compatible."); Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal De-
fendants: Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 235 (1966)("Had
the United States Supreme Court recognized what I think is clear-at least the improba-
bility, if not the impossibility, of an intelligent waiver of the fifth amendment privilege-
the justices might have squarely wrestled with the issue and said: 'Confessions are no
longer usable in our adversary system.' "). The argument is: (1) Major Premise: Any po-
lice interrogation, whether with warnings or without, is inherently compelling. (2) Mi-
nor Premise: Police interrogation is too useful to be banned. (3) Conclusion: Police
interrogation without warnings is not inherently compelling.
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decision to include the privilege in our fundamental law. Miranda
does no more (indeed, it does significantly less) than take the fifth
amendment seriously. Every argument against Miranda applies with
greater strength to the privilege in general. In any situation, some
factual difference can be converted into a distinction, with antipathy
to the privilege as a policy justification. But each such limitation is
subversive of constitutional law, for each elevates a conceded con-
temporary policy preference over a conceded constitutional value
judgment.
Forced to choose between the loss of some evidence and admit-
ting a judicial power to nullify constitutional rights I consider ex-
travagant, I would elect to surrender the evidence rather than the
enforcement of constitutional rights. This conclusion supports
stronger, not weaker, restrictions on police interrogation, pending
some change in the constitutional status of the privilege. In part,
this conclusion reflects the belief that a few more criminals, one way
or the other, is not a prize worth a wager of constitutionalism. But it
also reflects the belief that, to a greater degree than is widely sup-
posed, a change in the constitutional status of the privilege could be
achieved by the Supreme Court through a principled exercise in
constitutional interpretation.
B. DOES THE CONSTITUTION MAKE THE PRIVILEGE
A NECESSARY EVIL?
The fifth amendment plainly imposes the privilege on the fed-
eral government. The privilege, however, is binding on the states,
not by an express constitutional command, but by judicial decision.
In Malloy v. Hogan,108 the Court, overruling Twining v. New Jersey 10 9
and Adamson v. California 110 and casting aside dicta from Palko v. Con-
necticut, "11 held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
incorporates the privilege against self-incrimination. This conclu-
sion is not essential to constitutionalism; if the predicate for incor-
poration is fundamental fairness, reasons to regard the privilege as
no more than a windfall to lucky criminals provide a principled basis
for rejecting incorporation. Surely the case against the privilege at
least takes it out of the category of those rights that constitute "the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." 112 Among the great
108 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
109 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
110 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
111 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Palko was overruled in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
112 The Palko Court used this lanugage to describe the test of fundamental fairness
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jurists who at one time or another classified the privilege as some-
thing less than essential to fundamental fairness, in addition to Ben-
tham and Wigmore, are Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone,
Hughes, Black, Frankfurter, and the second Justice Harlan. l"8
Against their authority and the arguments inspiring it, Malloy
appears to be an extraordinarily weak opinion. The state did not
even contest the incorporation issue but claimed only that the scope
of the privilege should be decided by state rather than federal stan-
dards. 114 The Court cites the voluntariness cases, which explicitly
excluded the privilege from their rationale;" 15 the exclusionary rule
cases, whose connection to the privilege is now viewed as utterly
untenable; 116 and Dean Griswold's rather idiosyncratic statement
that the privilege is "a symbol of the America which stirs our
hearts." 117 The quotation accurately captures the tenor of the
opinion.
The Court should overrule Malloy and reinstate Twining and
Adamson. While the case might stand differently if incorporation
were, as Justice Black sometimes maintained, an all-or-nothing
proposition, 818 the Court has long refused to incorporate the provi-
governing the incorporation of items in the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
113 Justice Holmes signed the judgment in Twining. Justice Cardozo wrote Palko, and
Justices Stone, Hughes, Brandeis, and Black joined his opinion. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a concurring opinion in Adamson, rejecting total incorporation and praisingJustice
Moody's opinion in Twining. Justice Harlan dissented in Malloy. In addition to these
justices, the great lower court judges of the last generation either forthrightly denied, or
remained studiously agnostic about, the ultimate value of the privilege. See W. ScHAE-
FER, supra note 74, at 59-76; Friendly, supra note 71; Traynor, supra note 10, at 674-75.
114 378 U.S. at 9-10. Indeed, counsel for the state argued that the voluntariness doc-
trine really rested on the privilege against self-incrimination as support for the incorpo-
ration of the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 10 n.8.
115 See supra note 80.
116 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8-9. In Mapp v. Ohio, 369 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states; Justice Black provided the fifth
vote for the Mapp holding. InJustice Black's view, the exclusionary rule is a corollary of
the privilege against self-incrimination, because the privilege entitles the victim of an
illegal search to refuse to come forward with evidence of crime. But basing the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule on the fifth amendment fails to account for the limitation
of the privilege to testimonial evidence, or for the government's right to introduce even
testimonial evidence so long as the defendant is not the conduit of the information. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
414-15 (1971)(Burger, CJ., dissenting); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal
State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1088-90 n.16 (1959).
Justice Brennan, the author of Malloy, does not predicate the exclusionary rule in search
and seizure cases on the fifth amendment, but instead views it as an essential part of the
search victim's fourth amendment rights. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
933 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
117 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 9 n.7 (quoting E. GRISWOLD, supra note 49, at 7).
118 See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting).
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sions in the Bill of Rights providing for grand jury presentment and
civil jury trial.' l9 The Court openly picks and chooses based on a
sense of natural justice, and, by that standard, the privilege ought to
be disincorporated. This would free the states to develop humane
systems of in-court interrogation and would simultaneously enable
the Court to tighten restrictions on police interrogation.
The states might retain their own versions of the privilege.
State constitutions, however, are easier to change than is their fed-
eral counterpart, and developments such as California's adoption of
proposition eight suggest that the political will exists to reform state
constitutions.
Some states might decide upon one or another of the various
proposals for preliminary judicial examination of the accused. 120
But retention of the privilege would convert such proposals into the
effective abolition of interrogation. A suspect, warned of his right to
silence, advised by counsel, and protected by a magistrate from po-
lice bullying, will not confess. Every step in the direction of making
the suspect confess, whether by dispensing with counsel, warnings,
or by threatening to comment on the refusal to make a statement, is
a form of compulsion at war with the privilege. 12'
These proposals accept the logic of nullifying the privilege,
without countenancing police interrogation. To the extent such
proposals would not succeed in nullifying the privilege, important
and humanely obtainable evidence would be forgone, and a corr-
responding incentive would exist to circumvent the privilege by ad-
mitting the fruits of out-of-court interrogation. If preliminary
119 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875)(due process does not require civil jury trial);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)(due process does not require grand jury
review in state criminal proceedings); Israel, Foreword: Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71
GEo. L.J. 253, 290-301 (1982)(surveying incorporation decisions).
120 See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 74; Frankel, supra note 17; Kauper, supra note 62;
Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE SCL 1014 (1934). Each of these proposals provides for the questioning of
the suspect before trial by the magistrate, the prosecutor, or the police at the initial
appearance or a preliminary hearing.
121 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), bars comment on the defendant's failure
to take the stand at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), bars comment at trial on
the silence of an arrested person after the administration of Miranda warnings. Under
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches
with the commencement of formal proceedings. See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963)(per curiam)(admission as evidence of guilt at trial of uncounselled guilty plea
made at preliminary hearing violates right to counsel); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892)(privilege against self-incrimination applies before investigative grand
jury). If these rulings apply, as it seems they must, to preliminary judicial examination, a
suspect subjected to examination would have no incentive to make incriminating state-
ments and would not be likely to believe otherwise.
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examination would nullify the privilege, I do not see the point of
keeping the privilege on the books.
This is not to say that preliminary judicial examination would
not be far superior to police interrogation.1 22 But, I would prefer a
system of preliminary examination, backed by the trial court's right
to consider refusals to answer and, perhaps, with a contempt sanc-
tion enforceable by a differentjudge. At trial, the defendant should
be subject to compulsory process like any other witness and subject
to impeachment with his prior statement or prior silence. This
would secure, without brutality, a far greater quantity of probative
evidence and would also provide the police with a strong incentive
to comply with prompt presentment requirements.
Although the states might move in the direction I suggest, the
Court could virtually ensure such progress by imposing stricter con-
stitutional limits on police interrogation. Accordingly, I propose
that statements obtained by the police from persons under arrest be
made inadmissible, whether for impeachment or otherwise, at any
subsequent trial. At least three constitutional avenues are open to
such a rule.
First, the Supreme Court might impose this exclusionary rule as
a matter of fourteenth amendment due process. Independently of
the privilege against self-incrimination, due process forbids ex-
tracting confessions with third degree methods. 123 Surely the level
of police cruelty has declined, but, just as surely, enough remains to
justify constitutional scrutiny. Even in this relatively enlightened
era, members of the nation's largest police force allegedly have in-
terrogated petty criminals with the aid of an electric stun gun.1 24
Just as in the days of the Wickersham Commission, such abuse is
difficult to measure or to prove. 125 Just as in 1966, when Miranda
122 The foremost critic of police-interrogation, for example, has expressed significant,
if not unequivocal, support for the judicial examination proposals. See Kamisar, Kauper's
'Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later: Some Comments on a Remarkable Article,
in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 77.
123 See supra note 80.
124 N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 2. The incident may be less exotic than I like
to believe. More recently, a unanimous Illinois Supreme Court has held that the state
did not carry its burden of showing that injuries, proven to have been suffered by a
suspect in the custody of the Chicago police, were not inflicted by the police to extract a
confession. The defendant claimed that he confessed only after police beat and kicked
him, choked him with a plastic bag, and burned him against a radiator. See People v.
Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987).
125 See National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, supra note 62, at
48 ("It is conservative to say that for every one of the cases which do by a long chance
find a place in the official reports there are many hundreds, and probably thousands, of
instances of the use of third degree in one form or another.") (quoting A.B.A. Commit-
tee on Lawless Enforcement of Law) (footnote omitted). By now, the multiplier is proba-
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was decided, case-by-case adjudication cannot provide an effective
remedy. An effective prophylactic against police coercion, there-
fore, would be at least as justifiable as Miranda's prophylactic ap-
proach to the prevention of compelled testimony. 26
Second, the Court could revive Escobedo and extend the right to
counsel to the time of arrest. This could be coupled with rejection
of any waiver that allegedly takes place before the suspect actually
consults with an attorney. Many judges and commentators have ad-
vocated the first extension,1 27 and the New York courts have moved
bly lower, but it must remain substantial. For official reports of police cruelty, see
Bradford v.Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 476 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1973)
(excluding statement obtained from uncharged accomplice by means of torture); People
v. Wilson, 116 111. App. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987); Hill v. Wisconsin, 91 Wis. 2d 315,
283 N.W.2d 585 (1978)(defendant struck and tripped while handcuffed). Far more com-
mon are "swearing contests" in which the court chooses between the accounts of the
police and the accused. White, supra note 38, at 12 n.67. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 114
Ill. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123 (1986) (defendant who required surgery for crushed trachea
resulting from "blunt trauma" failed to prove that injury took place while in the custody
of the Chicago police; confession admitted).
126 Indeed, the legitimacy objection to Miranda is directed against the Court's positive
prescription of warnings and counsel, rather than against its negative pronouncement
that police interrogation as previously conducted violated the fifth amendment. See
Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 453-55. In requiring warnings and the offer of counsel, the
Court did not so much promulgate legislative rules as declare through judicial dicta a
prospective unwillingness to admit confessions in future cases unless certain procedures
are followed. The political branches may, of course, elect to interrogate without warn-
ings, but the courts will hold statements so obtained inadmissible. More generally, pro-
phylactic constitutional rules-rules that forbid constitutional state conduct that is
practically indistinguishable from unconstitutional state conduct-are recognized and
uncontroversial in many areas other than confessions. An example of a prophylactic
rule that protects fourteenth amendment due process is the requirement of proof by
clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness before the state may commit a mental
patient. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). This rule prevents the states from
committing some individuals who are in fact dangerous; any less stringent rule would
permit the states to commit many persons who are not dangerous. Although this ap-
proach is controversial, see Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of
Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985); Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978), the alternative is tolerance of
state action that does not demonstrably violate constitutional rights. Since most viola-
tions of constitutional rights can not be demonstrated with anything approaching cer-
tainty, the argument against prophylactic rules depends on thejudgment that it is better
to tolerate unconstitutional state action than to prevent constitutional state action. The
Court always has repudiated this judgment. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264,
404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (the Court has "no more right to decline the exercise ofjuris-
diction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given."). For further discussion,
see Dripps, The Constitutional Status of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 75 CAL. L. REv. -, -
n. 113 (1987) (forthcoming). Hostility to prophylactic rules often varies with the particu-
lar rule under consideration. For example, Professor Caplan, a leading defender of po-
lice interrogation, urges a constitutional prophylactic rule requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that a confession was obtained voluntarily to enforce the due process
voluntariness test. See Caplan, supra note 3, at 1473.
127 In a pronouncement later rendered inoperative by Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
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in the direction of the second. 128 With the demise of a constitu-
tional privilege, the Court could take both steps at once. 129
Third, the Court could constitutionalize, on fourth amendment
grounds, the old McNabb-Mallory rule.130 Interrogation typically re-
quires more time than it takes to simply bring the arrested person
before a judge for commitment. In theory, arrest has no purpose
other than enabling presentment to a judge, but, in practice, it is
often used for investigative interrogation. The Court could hold
any statement obtained during a period of unnecessary delay before
presentment the fruit of an unreasonable detention which is, there-
fore, inadmissible. Indeed, the chief obstacle to constitutionalizing
the McNabb-Mallowy rule is the need for confessions.' 31 It follows
that, with the demise of the privilege, this approach could contrib-
ute significantly to the elimination of police interrogation.13 2
Under any of these approaches, the states could be counted on
to respond to the overruling of Malloy. Regrettably, no principled
interpretation of the Constitution can enable parallel federal re-
forms until the fifth amendment privilege is repealed. Moreover, if
the privilege, unlike the due process voluntariness test, is ultimately
concerned with autonomy, then something far stronger than Mi-
randa would be required to protect the privilege against pretrial in-
(1972), a majority of the Escobedo Court opined that the fact that "[t]he interrogation
here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted.., should make no differ-
ence." 378 U.S. at 485. See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 431, 443 48 (1958)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957)(Black, J., dissenting)
("The right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when, for all practical
purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.")(footnote omit-
ted); Herman, supra note 30, at 490-95; Ogeltree, supra, note 3, at 1842-45.
128 See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976)
(once suspect has requested counsel or counsel has attempted to see suspect, suspect
may not effectively waive until after consulting with counsel).
129 For a strong defense of this construction of the right to counsel, even given the
availability of the privilege against self-incrimination, see State v. Wyer, 320 S.E.2d 92,
106-12 (W. Va. 1984)(Harshbarger, J., dissenting).
130 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957).
131 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, supra note 106, at 525, ("many hoped (and
many others feared) that some day the Court would apply the rule to the states as a
matter of Fourteenth Amendment due process."). Title II of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (1982), effectively overruled Mc-
Nabb and its progeny, because, unlike Miranda, which the statute also purports to
overrule, McNabb rested on the Supreme Court's federal supervisory power rather than
on the fourth or fifth amendment.
132 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (Douglas, J., concurring); W. SCHAEFER, supra
note 74, at 26 ("Since police interrogation has ordinarily been conducted prior to the
presentation of the suspect before a magistrate, it is usually argued that a rule requiring




terrogation by federal agents. 33
This drawback, however, is likely to prove less serious than it at
first appears. Federal prosecutors are adept at employing the inves-
tigative grand jury and granting immunity to overcome the obstacles
to law enforcement that the privilege poses. The outstanding rec-
ord of federal agents with respect to humane interrogation, a record
that goes back to the Wickersham Commission, strongly suggests
that, unlike their state counterparts, federal officers have little need
to extract confessions outside of court. Those federal crimes that
raise the need, such as bank robbery, are punished concurrently by
the states. At any rate, enforcement of unambiguous constitutional
judgments simply is not an issue governed by contemporary policy
preferences. If effective enforcement of the privilege at the federal
level allows some criminals to go unwhipped of justice, so be it.
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as society struggles to protect itself from crime, self-
incrimination will be with us. The only question is: how will society
go about inducing individuals to incriminate themselves? Very few
will ever do so autonomously, and none should do so in response to
needlessly cruel pressures. Miranda represents a valiant judicial ef-
fort to reconcile these judgments, but, as long as obtaining confes-
sions is seen as legitimate and even necessary, any serious
restriction on police interrogation is socially unacceptable.
That leaves giving up the privilege against self-incrimination.
No acute argument or memorable phrase will lead us to do that-
witness Bentham. Yet, ironically, we do not really need to be per-
suaded that the privilege is a mistake. The institution of police in-
terrogation proves our practical rejection of the privilege.
Regarding the values we hold, rather than those we celebrate, that
institution speaks more eloquently than any slogan, any argument.
133 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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